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Abstract
We study online resource allocation problems with a diseconomy of scale. In these
problems, there are certain requests, each demanding a set of resources, that arrive in an
online manner. The cost of each resource is semi-convex and grows superlinearly in the total
load on the resource. An irrevocable allocation decision has to be made directly after the
arrival of each request with the goal to minimize the total cost on the resources. We focus on
two simple greedy online policies that provide very fast and easy approximation algorithms.
The first policy is to minimize the individual cost of the current online request with
respect to all previous requests that have been allocated before. The second policy is to
minimize the marginal total cost over all requests that have arrived up to this point. In
the literature, these type of algorithms is also considered as one-round walks in congestion
games starting from the empty state.
We consider the weighted and unweighted version of the problem. In the weighted
variant, and for cost functions that are polynomials with maximal degree d and positive
coefficients, we proof a tight competitive ratio of
(
d
√
2− 1)−(d+1) for the marginal total cost
policy. This interestingly exactly matches the approximation factor for the corresponding
multiple-round walk algorithm. Our work indicates that one-round walks that start in an
empty starting state are exactly as efficient as multiple-round walks. We also show that this
does not carry over to the unweighted version of the problem. For unweighted instances, we
provide lower bounds for both policies that are significantly larger than the corresponding
multiple-round walks. We complement our results with an upper and lower bound on the
solution quality of the personal cost policy for weighted and unweighted instances.
1 Introduction
We consider the online variant of weighted and unweighted resource allocation problems
where a set of requests jointly uses a set of resources. The set of feasible allocations for each
request is a set of subsets of the resources. Each resource is endowed with a cost function
that is semi-convex and non-decreasing in the total load of that resource and thus models a
diseconomy of scale.
In the online variant, considered in this paper, the requests arrive one after the other and
upon arrival of a request, this request reveals its weight, and its set of feasible allocations.
At this point in time, we immediately have to irrevocably allocate the request to a set of
resources without any knowledge about requests that subsequently arrive. The objective is
to find an allocation for each request such that the total cost over all requests is minimized.
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We consider both weighted and unweighted problems. In the weighted case, the non-
negative, non-decreasing and semi-convex cost functions on the resources depend on the
total load on that resource. The total cost for some chosen allocation vector is separable
over resources and is defined as the sum of the resource costs. The cost on a resource is
given by the weight on that resource times the cost function evaluated for this weight.
This resource allocation problems naturally arise in the context of congestion minimiza-
tion in road networks. A widely used theoretical model to study congestion effects are
congestion games (Rosenthal [23]). In a congestion game, each request is identified with
a player that selfishly minimizes her private cost that she incurs due to her selected al-
location. In contrast to many recent works on the existence and inefficiency of equilibria
and their computational tractability, we focus on the online setting. This setting occurs
naturally when requests to a supplier of connected automotive navigation systems appear
online and the supplier wishes to route the requests in a way that minimizes overall conges-
tion. Online variants of congestion games have been analyzed in the context of one-round
walks when starting in the empty state. Here, we are interested in the competitive ratio of
our algorithms, which is defined by the worst possible factor of the solution quality of the
calculated solution compared to the offline optimal solution. Note, that this online proce-
dure immediately translates into an efficient, decentralized approximation algorithm with
the approximation guarantee of the derived competitive ratio.
In this work, we analyze the following two very basic greedy procedures. In the first al-
gorithm which we term PersonalCostWalk requests are allocated to the set of resources
that minimize their personal cost. In the second algorithm termed SocialCostWalk re-
quests are allocated to the set of resources that minimize the total cost with respect to
the current state. Although the setting of online variants of congestion games and resource
allocation problems is well studied in the literature, the two most basic greedy approaches
have only been analyzed for the case of linear cost functions. In this domain for unweighted
requests, minimizing personal cost is provably better than minimizing social cost by a con-
stant factor [8, 13]. We extend this work to weighted requests and arbitrary non-negative,
semi-convex cost functions. We derive explicit bounds on the solution quality for polynomial
cost functions with positive coefficients and maximal degree d that do only depend on d. We
show that the constant gap for linear cost functions grows exponentially in d. Furthermore,
all our bounds are independent of the number of requests.
As we discuss in more detail in Section 1.1, online problems have been studied for a
related problem where the cost of a resource is the integral of the cost function from zero to
the load rather than the product of the load and the cost as in our setting [16, 19, 18]. As
remarked by Farzad [16], for polynomial cost function, these models are actually equivalent
in the sense that for each instance in one model one can construct an equivalent instance in
the other model. As a consequence, the lower bound obtained by Farzad et al. [16] and the
upper bound obtained by Harks et al. [19] translate to our setting.
1.1 Related Work
Already the offline version of the resource allocation problem studied in this paper are very
challenging. Roughgarden [24] showed that there is a constant β > 0 such that even the
unweighted version of the offline problem cannot be approximated in polynomial time by
a factor better than (βd)d/2 when all cost functions are polynomials of maximum degree d
with non-negative coefficients. The currently best-known algorithm is due to Makarychev
and Srividenko [20] and uses a convex programming relaxation. They showed that randomly
rounding an optimal fractional solution gives an O(( 0.792dln(d+1))d) approximate solution. This
approach is highly centralized and relies on the fact all requests are initially known, which
both might be unrealistic assumptions for large-scale problems.
Offline and decentralized algorithms for this problem, that have been studied in the
literature, are local search algorithms and multi-round best-response dynamics. For best-
responses with respect to personal cost, local search algorithms are closely related to the
studies of Nash equilibria. Nash equilibria are typically good approximations to the total
cost. The notion of the price of stability serves as a lower bound on the approximation
factor, where the price of anarchy is an upper bound. For polynomial congestion games that
admit a Nash equilibrium, Aland et al. [1] proved tight results on the price on anarchy for
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both weighted and unweighted congestion games by solving an optimization problem of the
form
min
λ>0,µ∈[0,1)
{ λ
1− µ : c(x+ y) ≤ λxc(x) + µyc(y), ∀x, y ∈ N, c ∈ Cd
}
,
where Cd is the set of cost functions in the game. When Cd is the set of polynomial functions
with maximum degree d and positive coefficients, this gives a bound on the price of anarchy
of Φd+1d where Φd ∈ Θ( dln(d)) is the solution to (x + 1)d = xd+1. The price of stability as a
lower bound on the solution quality was not well understood for a long time for weighted
congestion games. Very recently, Christodoulou et al. [11] showed that the price of stability is
at least (Φd/2)
d+1 for large d. For unweighted congestion games, Christodoulou and Gairing
[10] showed a tight bound on the price of stability in the order of Θ(d). Unfortunately, the
deterministic best-response walk towards such a solution can take exponential time [14] in
unweighted congestion games, or might even cycle in weighted instances. Though random
walks [17] or walks using approximate best-response steps [3] converge to approximate Nash
equilibria in polynomial time.
Mirrokni and Vetta [21] are the first to study best-response dynamics with respect to
social cost. Bjelde, Klimm and Schmand [7] analyzed the solution quality of local minima
of the social cost function both for weighted and unweighted resource allocation problems,
see Table 1. By a result of Orlin et al. [22], this admits a PTAS in the sense that an
(1 + ǫ)-approximate local optimal solution can be computed in polynomial time via local
improvement steps. This local search algorithm is highly related to our work since this can
be seen as a multiple round social cost work.
In contrast to this, one-round walks touch every request only once at the point in time
when it arrives. Fanelli et al. have shown a linear lower bound even for linear cost functions
if the requests are restricted to make one best-response starting from a bad initial configu-
ration [15]. This lower bound does not hold for the empty state. There is a set of results
for one-round works with respect to personal cost [13, 6, 8] and social cost for linear cost
functions [4, 8, 26], for details see Table 1.
Closest to our work are the works of Harks et al. [19, 18] and Farzad et al. [16] who studied
very related algorithms for online routing and even a generalization where requests are only
present during certain time windows. However, they measure cost slightly differently as they
define the cost of a resource as the integral of its cost function from 0 to the current load.
This different cost measure leads also to a different notion of the private cost of a request.
However, as remarked by Farzad et al. [16], the models are equivalent when only polynomial
costs are considered. Farzad et al. provided a lower bound of (d+1)d+1 on the competitive
ratio of the personal cost one-round walk for polynomial cost functions of degree d and
positive coefficients. This lower bound also applies to our setting and we could strengthen
this bound to Ω(( dln 2 )
d+1) for the weighted setting. Harks et al. [19] also consider personal
cost one-round walks and show that it is O(1.77ddd+1)-competitive. We are able to slightly
refine and improve this bound as we show that the algorithm is ( d
W ( d
d+1 )
)d+1 where W is
the product logarithm. In contrast to the bound of Harks et al., our bound holds for all d,
asymptotically it approaches ( dW (1) )
d+1 ≈ (1.763d)d+1.
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1.2 Our Contribution
We show upper and lower bounds for the online variant of weighted and unweighted re-
source allocation problems with semi-convex cost functions. We analyze two different very
simple greedy techniques in one-round walks starting in the empty state. We use best-
responses with respect to a request’s personal cost or the increase of the social cost incurred
by a request, and we call the algorithms PersonalCostWalk and SocialCostWalk,
respectively.
Let Cd be the class of polynomial functions with maximal degree d and positive co-
efficients. For weighted resource allocation problems, we give a tight bound of ( d+1
√
2 −
1)−(d+1) ∈ O
((
d
ln 2
)d+1)
for SocialCostWalk. This is exactly the locality gap of the
social cost function. It shows that the very easy and fast one-round walk algorithm es-
tablishes the same approximation guarantee as the PTAS local search procedure described
in Bjelde et al. [7]. Our algorithm even works in an online setting and does only need
n best-response computations. For PersonalCostWalk, we get an upper bound of
Ψd+1d ∈ O
((
d
W ( d
d+1 )
)d+1)
. Here Ψd is the unique solution to (d+ 1)(x+ 1)
d = xd+1 and W
is the product logarithm function on R≥0. This upper bound is significantly larger than the
one for the price of anarchy. However, note that due to the absence of a potential function,
deterministic best response dynamics do not converge to a Nash equilibrium in weighted
congestion games.
We complement these results with a matching lower bound for social cost. Due to the
special structure of the lower bound instance, it also holds for the case of personal cost.
This improves the previously known bound by Farzad et al. [16]. Please note that Bjelde
et al. also presented an instance in [7], which can be shown to be a matching lower bound
instance for social cost, but cannot be transferred to the case of personal cost easily.
For unweighted resource allocation problems, we separate the asymptotic performance
guarantee of both considered one-round walks from the local search procedure. We provide
a lower bound of Ad ∈ Ω
(
( d+1e ln 2 )
d+1
)
for SocialCostWalk. Here Ad is the d
th ordered
Bell number [5]. The lower bound of (d+1)d+1 by Farzad et al. applies to PersonalCost-
Walk. Please note that both lower bounds are of the form Ω
(
(dc )
d+1
)
for some constant
c. This indicates that, in contrast to the weighted setting, the one-round or online variant
of the problem significantly increases the approximation ratio compared to the local search
algorithm for the unweighted case.
We complete our analysis of the two one-round walks by an upper bound for personal
cost. We separate the unweighted case from the weighted case and show an upper bound
of O ((Ξd)d+1) for sufficiently large d, where Ξ is the solution to the equation 2Ξe 1Ξ +Ξ2 =
e
2
Ξ + Ξ2e
1
Ξ , i.e. Ξ ≈ 1.523.
2 Preliminaries
We consider online algorithms for unsplittable resource allocation problems. Let R be a
finite set of resources r each endowed with a non-negative cost function cr : R≥0 → R≥0.
There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of n players. At time step i, player i reveals its existence, its
weight wi ∈ R≥0 and a set Si ⊆ 2R of possible allocations. If wi = 1 for all i ∈ N , we call
the instance unweighted. Upon arrival of player i, an allocation Si ∈ Si of player i has to be
fixed irrevocably by an online algorithm.
For i ∈ N , let S≤i = S1×· · ·×Si−1×Si be the set of all allocation vectors up to player i.
The cost of an allocation vector S≤i = (S1, . . . , Si−1, Si) ∈ S≤i is defined as
C(S≤i) =
i∑
j=1
∑
r∈Sj
wjcr(wr(S≤i)),
where wr(S≤i) =
∑
j∈N :r∈Sj wj denotes the load of resource r under allocation vector S≤i.
In the following, we write S and S instead of S≤n and S≤n. Given a sequence R =
(w1,S1), . . . , (wn,Sn) of requests, the offline optimum solution is be denoted by OPT(R) =
minS∈S C(S). As a convention, system optimal strategy profiles are denoted by S∗. For a
sequence of requests R and i ∈ N , denote by R≤i = (w1,S1), . . . , (wi−1,Si−1), (wi,Si) the
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linear ce ce of max. degree d
unweighted: lower upper lower bnd. upper bnd.
inefficiency of Nash eq. 1.57 [8] 2.5 [12] d+ 1 [10] Θ( dlnd )
d+1 [1]
local search soc. cost 3 [9] 3 [7] ⌊ dln (d+2)−1⌋d+1[7] O
( (
2d
ln d
)d+1 )
[7]
one-r. pers. cost 4.24 [6] 4.24 [13] (d+ 1)d+1 [16] O((Ξd)d+1)[Th. 7]
one-r. social cost 5.66 [8] 5.66 [26] Ω
((
d+1
e ln 2
)d+1)
[Th. 8] -
weighted:
inefficiency of Nash eq. - 2.62 [2] Θ( dln d)
d+1[11] Θ( dln d)
d+1[1]
local search soc. cost 5.83 [7] 5.83 [7] Ω
((
d
ln 2
)d+1)
[7] O
((
d
ln 2
)d+1)
[7]
one-r. pers. cost 5.83 [8] 5.83 [19] Ω
((
d
ln 2
)d+1)
[Th. 5]
(
d
W ( d
d+1
)
)d+1
[Th. 2]
one-r. social cost 5.83 [8] 5.83 [4] Ω
((
d
ln 2
)d+1)
[Th. 6] O
((
d
ln 2
)d+1)
[Th. 4]
Table 1: Overview over our and related results. Result obtained in this paper are marked in
blue. The lower (upper) bound on the inefficiency of Nash equilibria is the price of anarchy
(price of stability). Here Ξ ≈ 1.523, and W denotes the product logarithm function on R≥0.
subsequence of requests up to player i. An online algorithm ALG is a family of functions
fi : R≤i → Si mapping partial requests up to player i to a respective allocation for player i.
For a sequence of requests R, the cost of an online algorithm ALG with a family of functions
(fi)i∈N is the given by ALG(R) = C(S) where S = S1 × · · · × Sn and Si = fi(R≤i).
We measure the performance of an online algorithm by its competitive ratio which is ρ =
supRALG(R)/OPT(R) where the supremum is taken over all finite sequences of requests
for which OPT(R) > 0. Typically, the response steps used by our online algorithms are
tracktable and therefore ρ is also the approximation factor for the corresponding distributed
approximation algorithm. When the sequence of requests R is clear from context, we write
ALG and OPT instead of ALG(R) and OPT(R).
We consider two greedy online algorithms. The algorithm PersonalCostWalk greed-
ily minimizes the cost of the current request. Let again denote S≤i the allocation vector of
the algorithm before the i-th request is revealed. Then, wicr(wr(S<i)) is the per request
cost at the arrival of request i on resource r. Upon arrival of request i, the greedy allocation
algorithm chooses an allocation Si ∈ Si that minimizes the cost of that request, i.e. we
choose some allocation Si such that,∑
r∈Si
wicr(wr((S<i))) ≤
∑
r∈S′
i
wicr(wr(S<i)) . (1)
The algorithm SocialCostWalk minimizes the marginal increase of the total cost in
each step. Let S<i = (f1(R≤1), . . . , fi−1(R≤i−1)) denote the allocation vector before the i-th
request is revealed. Then, cr(wr(S<i)) is the cost on resource r at this step of the algorithm.
We denote the corresponding total cost on resource r by Cr(wr(S<i)) = wr(S<i)cr(wr(S<i)).
Upon arrival of request i, we allocate a set of resources to request i, such that the marginal
increase in the total social cost is minimized. Denoting the choice of the algorithm by
Si = fi(R≤i), we have∑
r∈Si
Cr(wr(S<i) + wi)− Cr(wr(S<i)) ≤
∑
r∈S′
i
Cr(wr(S<i) + wi)− Cr(wr(S<i)) , (2)
for all other feasible allocations S′i ∈ Si.
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3 Weighted Resource Allocation Problems
In this section, we give upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratio for Personal-
CostWalk and SocialCostWalk in weighted resource allocation problems. The study of
these algorithms is motivated by the work of [13] and [8]. They showed that one-round walks
with respect to the cost per request result in a provably better competitive ratio than walks
with respect to the social cost for congestion games with unweighted requests and linear
cost functions. We show that, for d > 1, this also holds for walks on weighted instances and
that the multiplicative gap between the two algorithms increases exponentially.
For the upper bounds, we use the smoothness framework which has also been used before
by [1] and [25]. We show that we can derive an optimization problem such that the solution
to the optimation problem is an upper bound on the competitive ratio. We show that for
SocialCostWalk this optimization problem is exactly the same as the one that appeared
in [7], thus our upper bound here is identical. For PersonalCostWalk, the optimization
problem is different. For the case that all cost functions are in the class Cd, we achieve a
bound of O
(
( d
W ( d
d+1 )
)d+1
)
where W is the product logarithm function defined on R≥0.
We give a lower bound construction on which both algorithms, PersonalCostWalk
and SocialCostWalk, behave identically and show a bound of Ω(( dln 2 )
d+1). Furthermore,
we show that the bound on the locality gap by Bjelde et al. [7] also applies to SocialCost-
Walk. Unfortunately, it cannot be easily extended to PersonalCostWalk.
3.1 Personal Cost Upper Bound
In order to show an upper bound on the competitive ratio of PersonalCostWalk, we use
Inequality 1, that captures the local decision policy. We derive a new (λ, µ)-optimization
problem and show that there is an upper bound on the optimal solution value of Ψd+1d ,
where Ψd is the unique solution to the equality (d + 1)(x + 1)
d = xd+1. The analysis is in
large parts similar to that of the price of anarchy given in Aland et al. [1].
Lemma 1. Let C be a set of semi-convex and non-decreasing cost functions and let β =
supc∈C,x∈R≥0
c(x)+c′(x)x
c(x) . Further, let λ > 0 and µ ∈ [0, β) be such that
xc(x + y) ≤ λxc(x) + µyc(y) for all x, y ∈ R≥0 and c ∈ C .
Then PersonalCostWalk is βλ1−βµ -competitive.
Proof. Let S<i = (f1(R≤1), . . . , fi−1(Ri−1)) denote the allocation vector before the i-th
request is revealed and cr(wr(S<i)) denote the correspond cost on resource r. Denoting the
choice of the algorithm by Si = fi(R≤i) and an optimal allocation by S∗, we obtain the
Inequality 1 ∑
r∈Si
cr(wr(S<i) + wi) ≤
∑
r∈S∗
i
cr(wr(S<i) + wi) . (3)
The total cost after the i-th request is revealed is
C(S≤i) =
∑
r∈R
wr(S≤i)cr(wr(S≤i))
=
∑
r∈Si
(wr(S≤i−1) + wi)cr(wr(S≤i−1) + wi) +
∑
r/∈Si
wr(S≤i−1)cr(wr(S≤i−1))
= C(S≤i−1) +
∑
r∈Si
(wr(S≤i−1) + wi)cr(wr(S≤i−1) + wi)− wr(S≤i−1)cr(wr(S≤i−1))
≤ C(S≤i−1) +
∑
r∈Si
wi
(
cr(wr(S≤i)) + c′r(wr(S≤i))wr(S≤i)
)
≤ C(S≤i−1) + β
∑
r∈Si
wi cr(wr(S<i) + wi) ≤ C(S≤i−1) + β
∑
r∈S∗i
wi cr(wr(S<i) + wi) .
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Using this inequality n times we obtain
C(S) =
∑
i∈N
C(S≤i)− C(S≤i−1) ≤
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈S∗
i
β wi cr(wr(S<i) + wi)
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈S∗
i
β wi cr(wr(S) + wr(S
∗)) = β
∑
r∈R
wr(S
∗)cr(wr(S) + wr(S∗))
≤ β
∑
r∈R
λwr(S
∗)cr(wr(S∗)) + µwr(S)cr(wr(S)) = βλC(S∗) + βµC(S) .
Rearranging terms gives the claimed result.
We proceed to use Lemma 1 in order to give an upper bound on the competitive ratio
of PersonalCostWalk. We will express the competitive ratio in terms of the unique
solution to the equation (d+ 1)(x+ 1)d = xd+1 which we will denote by Ψd.
Theorem 2. For polynomial cost functions with non-negative coefficients and maximal de-
gree d, the competitive ratio of the PersonalCostWalk is at most Ψd+1d where Ψd is the
unique solution to the equation (d+ 1)(x+ 1)d = xd+1.
Proof. By splitting up resources with cost functions c into several resources, we may assume
that each resource has a cost function of the form cr(x) = arx
dr with dr ∈ [0, d] and
ar ∈ R≥0. We then obtain
β = sup
c∈C
sup
x∈R≥0
c(x) + xc′(x)
c(x)
= sup
a∈R≥0,k∈[0,d]
sup
x∈R≥0
axk + akxk
axk
= d+ 1 .
In light of Lemma 1, we can bound the competitive ratio ρ of PersonalCostWalk by
solving the following minimization problem
ρ ≤ inf
λ∈R>0
µ∈[0, 1
d+1 )
{
(d+ 1)λ
1− (d+ 1)µ : x(x + y)
k ≤ λxk+1 + µyk+1 for all x, y ∈ R≥0, k ∈ [0, d]
}
.
Dividing the inequality by xk+1 and substituting z = y/x gives the equivalent formulation
ρ ≤ inf
λ∈R>0
µ∈[0, 1
d+1 )
{
(d+ 1)λ
1− (d+ 1)µ : λ ≥ (z + 1)
k − µzk+1 for all z ∈ R≥0, k ∈ [0, d]
}
= inf
µ∈[0, 1
d+1 )
sup
z∈R≥0
k∈[0,d]
{
(z + 1)k − µzk+1
1
d+1 − µ
}
.
Aland et al. [1, Lemma 5.1] show that (z+1)d−µzd+1 ≥ (z+1)k−µzk+1 for all k ∈ [0, d] for
which the latter term is non-negative. They further show [1, Lemma 5.2] that the function
(z + 1)d − µzd+1 has a unique maximum on R≥0. We thus obtain
ρ ≤ inf
µ∈[0, 1
d+1 )
max
z∈R≥0
{
(z + 1)d − µzd+1
1
d+1 − µ
}
.
Let Ψd be the solution to the equation (d + 1)(x + 1)
d = xd+1. We claim that the
term above can be upper bounded by Ψd+1d . To this end, consider the functions g : R≥0 ×
[0, 1d+1)→ R and h : R≥0 → R defined as
g(x, µ) =
(x + 1)d − µxd+1
1
d+1 − µ
h(x) =
d(x + 1)d−1
(d+ 1)xd
.
We first show that h(Ψd) ∈ [0, 1d+1). To see this, note that
h(Ψd) =
d(Ψd + 1)
d−1
(d+ 1)Ψdd
=
d
d+1(Ψd + 1)
d
Ψdd(Ψd + 1)
=
d
(d+1)2Ψ
d+1
d
Ψdd(Ψd + 1)
=
d
(d+1)2Ψd
Ψd + 1
=
1
d+ 1
· d
d+ 1
· Ψd
Ψd + 1
∈
(
0,
1
d+ 1
)
.
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Second, we claim that if there is a pair (xˆ, µˆ) ∈ R≥0 × (0, 1d+1 ) with µˆ = h(xˆ), then,
g(xˆ, µˆ) = maxx∈R≥0 g(x, µˆ). To see this claim, note that by construction of h, xˆ satisfies
the first order maximality conditions of g(·, µˆ). As shown by Aland et al. [1, Lemma 5.2],
the function (x + 1)d − µxd+1 has a unique maximum and is increasing for values smaller
than the maximum and decreasing for all values larger than the maximum. This implies the
claim.
For µˆ = h(Ψd), we obtain
ρ ≤ max
x∈R≥0
g(x, µˆ) = g(Ψd, µˆ) =
(Ψd + 1)
d − µˆΨd+1d
1
d+1 − µˆ
= Ψd+1d ,
which completes the proof. Furthermore, we have for all µ ∈ (0, 1d+1 ) that ρ ≥ Ψd+1d .
3.2 Social Cost Upper Bound
We will prove an upper bound on the competitve ratio of SocialCostWalk by using
Inequality 2. We will derive the following (λ, µ)-optimization problem that has also been
considered in [7]. Subsequently we can use the results of [7] to derive an upper bound on
the competitive ratio of (d+1
√
2− 1)−(d+1) ∈ O( dln 2 )d+1.
Lemma 3. Let C be a set of semi-convex and non-decreasing cost functions, λ > 0 and
µ ∈ [0, 1) such that
(x+ y)c(x + y)− yc(y) ≤ λxc(x) + µyc(y) for all x, y ∈ R and c ∈ C. (4)
Then SocialCostWalk is λ1−µ -competitive.
Proof. Let S<i denote the allocation vector before the i-th request is revealed, and let
Cr(wr(S<i)) = wr(S<i)cr(wr(S<i)), as above. Upon arrival of request i, we allocate a set of
resources to request i, such that the marginal increase in the total social cost is minimized.
Inequality 2 allows us to bound the cost incurred by the algorithm with
ALG(R) =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
r∈Si
Cr(wr(S<i) + wi)− Cr(wr(S<i))
≤
∑
i∈[n]
∑
r∈S∗
i
Cr(wr(S<i) + wi)− Cr(wr(S<i))
≤
∑
i∈[n]
∑
r∈S∗
i
Cr(wr(S) + wi)− Cr(wr(S))
≤
∑
r∈R
Cr(wr(S) + wr(S
∗))− Cr(wr(S)) .
The first inequality uses (2) and the second and third inequality use the convexity of Cr(x).
Using (4), we have
Cr(wr(S) + wr(S
∗))− Cr(wr(S)) ≤ µCr(wr(S)) + λCr(wr(S∗))
so that we obtain
ALG(R) ≤ µALG(R) + λOPT(R),
which implies the claimed result.
Using this lemma, we establish the competitiveness of SocialCostWalk for polynomial
cost functions with non-negative coefficients and maximal degree d.
Theorem 4. For polynomial cost functions with non-negative coefficients and maximal
degree d, SocialCostWalk is (d+1
√
2 − 1)−(d+1)-competitive where (d+1√2 − 1)−(d+1) ∈
O( dln 2 )d+1.
8
r1
r2
r3
r4
r5
r6
r7
r8
r9
r10
r11
r12
r13
r14
r15
r16
c3
c2
c2
c
c
c
c
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Figure 1: Optimal assignment for n = 15
with demands and server loads.
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Figure 2: Adversarial assignment for n =
15 with demands and resource loads.
Proof. With the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2, it is without loss of generality
to assume that for each resource the cost function is of the form cr(x) = arx
dr with ar ∈ R≥0
and dr ∈ [0, d]. In light of Lemma 3, we are interested in solving the following the following
minimization problem
min
λ>0
µ∈[0,1)
{
λ
1− µ : (x+ y)
k+1 − yk+1 ≤ µxk+1 + λyk+1 for all x, y ∈ R≥0, k ∈ [0, d]
}
.
In Bjelde et al. [7], it is shown that the optimal solution of this optimization problem is
(d+1
√
2− 1)−(d+1) which is attained for λ = 2 dd+1 (2 1d+1 − 1)−d and µ = 2 dd+1 − 1.
3.3 Personal Cost Lower Bound
Our lower bound construction on the competitive ratio of the PersonalCostWalk algo-
rithm is a weighted singleton resource allocation problem with identical cost functions. This
bound also applies to SocialCostWalk. We also show that the lower bound construction
for the locality gap provided by [7] also works in the online setting.
The lower bound construction for PersonalCostWalk is as follows. In every step,
requests can be allocated to exactly two different single resources and both the cost functions
and the current load for both options is identical. Therefore requests are indifferent between
these options for both algorithms. We assume all ties are broken arbitrarily and chose the
player weights in a way such as to maximize the ratio up to a constant factor between the
cost incurred by the algorithm and the cost of the optimal solution.
Theorem 5. There is a weighted resource allocation problem with cost functions in Cd,
where both PersonalCostWalk and SocialCostWalk calculate a solution with cost
1
2( d+1
√
2−1)d+1 ∈ Ω((
d
ln 2 )
d+1) times the optimal cost.
Proof Outline. The structure of the instance is the same as for Theorem 8. There are n
requests N with weights wi = c
(⌊log(n)⌋−⌊log(i)⌋), where c is a non-negative constant that will
be chosen later. In addition, there are n+1 resources rj , each resource with cost crj (x) = x
d.
Request i ∈ [n] can be either allocates to ri−2⌊log(i)⌋+1 or ri+1.
In the optimal solution, every request i gets assigned to resources ri+1, so no resource
has more than one player. Therefore, the cost of the optimal solution is
C(S∗) =
⌊log(n)⌋∑
i=0
2i
(
c⌊log(n)⌋−i
)d+1
.
The order of arrival of the request is in decreasing order from n to 1. We assume that the
tie-breaking is towards the resource with the lower index. In this way, whenever a request
9
arrives, the load on both resources is identical. Therefore, in both algorithms Personal-
CostWalk and SocialCostWalk, all requests i get assigned to resources ri−2⌊log(i)⌋+1.
In the end, the load on resource rj is
∑⌊log(n)⌋−⌈log(j)⌉
i=0 c
i.
In Appendix 5.2, we show that for c = 21/(d+1), we get
C(S)
C(S∗)
≥
∑⌊log(n)⌋−1
i=0
(
1− 2− i+1d+1
)d+1
(1 + ⌊log(n)⌋)
(
2
1
d+1 − 1
)d+1 .
We show that
(
2
i+1
d+1 − 1
)d+1
≥ 2i for all i ≥ log(e)(d+ 1)2. In the limit, we have
lim
n→∞
C(S)
C(S∗)
≥ lim
n→∞
(⌊log(n)⌋ − log(e)(d+ 1)2 − 1)
2(1 + ⌊log(n)⌋)
(
2
1
(d+1) − 1)
)d+1 = 1
2
(
d+1
√
2− 1)d+1 .
3.4 Social Cost Lower Bound
To obtain a lower bound on the competitive ratio of the social cost greedy algorithm, we
revisit a construction due to Bjelde et al. [7]. They use this construction to show that the
locality gap is (d+1
√
2 − 1)−(d+1), but it is not hard to verify that the same construction
also provides a lower bound for the competitiveness of the social cost greedy allocation
procedure. This proves that the upper bound given in Section 3.2 is tight. The reverse
is not true, the bound described here does not translate to an identical lower bound for
PersonalCostWalk.
Theorem 6. For every d ∈ R≥0, there is a weighted resource allocation problem with poly-
nomial cost functions in Cd, so that the cost of the solution computed by SocialCostWalk
is ( d+1
√
2− 1)−(d+1) times the optimal cost.
Proof. We start the proof by restating the construction of the example provided by Bjelde
et al. [7]. For any given d and k ∈ Z0, we define a resource allocation problem with k + 1
requests and k + 2 resources. Analogously to the description in [7], let β = d+1
√
2 − 1. We
are given resources R = {r1, . . . , rk+2}, where cri(x) = β(i−1)(d+1)xd for i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}
and crk+2(x) = crk+1(x) = β
k(d+1)xd. Every request i can only be assigned to either ri or
ri+1.
Bjelde et al. have shown that the allocation vector S = (r1, . . . , rk+1) is a local optimal
solution. They have argued that allocating request k + 1 to rk+2 instead of rk+1 does not
improve the total cost, since the cost functions are the same. They have also shown that
assigning request i ∈ {1, . . . , k} to ri+1 instead of ri, does not change the total cost, since
there is already a request on resource ri+1. If we now let the requests arrive in decreasing
order and always assign the resource with smaller index, it is clear that our algorithm would
construct the local optimal solution S. Since the cost functions of [7] and our work are the
same, we get
lim
k→∞
C(S)
C(S∗)
=
1
( d+1
√
2− 1)d+1 ,
which implies the result.
4 Unweighted Resource Allocation Problems
In this section, we consider unweighted resource allocation problems and derive upper and
lower bounds on the competitive ratio for the unweighted case. Interestingly, we show a
significant difference to the weighted setting, where PersonalCostWalk and the local
search procedure achieve exactly the same approximation ratio. We show in this section
that this is no longer true in the unweighted case by providing a lower bound example, that
both holds for PersonalCostWalk and SocialCostWalk. Here, we can show that the
competitive ratio is at least in Ω
(
( dln 2 )
d+1
)
, and thus significantly larger than the upper
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bound on the local search procedure of O (( 2dln d )d+1). We complete the section with a refined
upper bound for PersonalCostWalkand unweighted instances. An improved analysis of
the upper bound on the competitive ratio of SocialCostWalk for unweighted instances
remains open.
Recall that the sequence of requests is given by R = (1,S1), . . . , (1,Sn) for unweighted
resource allocation problems, i.e. wi = 1 for all i ∈ N . This implies that the cost functions
cr directly define the per request cost on this resource, since wicr = cr in this case. The cost
functions cr now do only depend on the number of requests that have chosen some resource
r.
4.1 Personal Cost Upper Bound
In the following, we show an upper bound of O((Ξd)d+1) on the competitive ratio of Per-
sonalCostWalk for unweighted resource allocation problems with cost functions in Cd.
Here, Ξ is the unique solution to 2xe1/x + x2 = e2/x + x2e1/x and Ξ ≈ 1.523. Analogously
to Section 3.1, we use Inequality 1 to derive an inequality that fits the (λ, µ)-smoothness
framework. In contrast to the previous section, this inequality only has to hold for integral
x = wr(S
∗) and y = wr(S).
The smoothness framework allows us to bound the loss of the algorithm compared to
the optimal solution on every resource. To retain generality, let dr ≤ d denote the maximal
degree of the cost function cr. We show that for every resource r, the inequality is fulfilled
for λd ∈ O((Ξd)d+1) and a constant 0 < µ < 1. Towards this end, we make a case distinction
between y ≤ dr, y > dr and x = 1, and y > dr and x > 1. The bound on the second case
dominates the other two and gives the result.
Theorem 7. The algorithm PersonalCostWalk is asymptotically O
(
(Ξd)d+1
)
com-
petitive for unweighted instances cost functions in Cd. Here, Ξ is the unique solution to
2xe1/x + x2 = e2/x + x2e1/x and Ξ ≈ 1.523.
In this section, we only give a short overview over the proof of Theorem 7. Please see
Appendix 5.3 for the full proof.
Proof Outline. We sum the marginal cost over all players and get
C(S) =
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈Si
(
(wr(S<i + 1))
dr+1 − wr(S<i)dr+1
)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈Si
(
(dr + 1) (wr(S<i) + 1)
dr +
dr∑
k=0
wr(S<i)
k (dr + 1)!
k!(dr + 1− k)!
)
−
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈Si
dr∑
k=0
(
wr(S<i)
k dr!
k!(dr − k)! · (dr + 1)
)
.
Then we apply Inequality 1, our condition derived from the properties of PersonalCost-
Walk, and obtain
C(S) ≤
∑
r∈R
(dr + 1)wr(S
∗) (wr(S) + 1)
dr −
∑
r∈R
wr(S)
dr+2 − (wr(S)− 1)dr+2
dr + 2
.
Then we show, that we can find suitable λd and µd such that
(dr + 1)(y + 1)
drx− ydr−1 + y
dr+2 − (y − 1)dr+2
dr + 2
≤ λdxdr+1 + µdydr+1
for all x, y ∈ N≥0 and dr ≤ d. Applying this to all r ∈ R yields a competitive ratio of λd1−µd .
So we seek to minimize λd1−µd such that the inequality is fulfilled. We will show in Lemma
11 that there is a solution to the minimization problem such that λd1−µd is upper bounded
by (Ξd)d+1.
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Figure 4: Adversarial assignment in the
worst-case instance with resource loads.
4.2 Unweighted Social Cost Lower Bound
We give a lower bound instance that uses the graph structure sketched in Figure 3 and
Figure 4. It is based on a singleton congestion game with identical cost functions on all
resources. On arrival, all requests have two options that, at this point in time, have identical
load. Therefore, SocialCostWalk is indifferent between both options. We assume that
ties are broken adversarily.
Theorem 8. There is a unweighted resource allocation problem with cost functions in Cd
where SocialCostWalk calculates a solution with cost Ad+1 ∈ Ω
((
d+1
e ln(2)
)d+1)
times the
optimal cost. Here Ad+1 is the (d+ 1)-th ordered Bell number
1.
Proof. In the lower bound instance, there are n requests N and n+ 1 resources R where n
is a multiple of 2. The two possible strategies for request i is either the singleton strategy
ri−2⌊log(i)⌋+1 or ri+1). Requests arrive in increasing order of indices.
In the optimal solution OPT, all requests i are matched to resource ri+1. So every
resource serves one request and therefore C(OPT) = n.
Whereas in the algorithm, when request i arrives, the load on both available resources
is identical, so the algorithm is indifferent between both choices. We assume that all ties
are broken adversarily and i is assigned to resource ri−2⌊log(i)⌋+1. In this way, the load on
resource rj is ⌊log(n)⌋ − ⌊log(j)⌋.
With crj (x) = x
d, the total cost of the algorithm is
C(ALG) =
log(n+1)−1∑
t=1
(
td+1
2t+1
(n+ 1)
)
+ log(n+ 1)d+1 .
In the limit, this gives the following bound on the competitive ratio
C(ALG)
C(OPT)
≥ lim
n→∞
1
2
log(n+1)−1∑
t=1
td+1
2t
=
1
2
∞∑
t=1
td+1
2t
=
1
2
Ad+1 ,
where Ad+1 =
(d+1)!
2 ln(2)d+2 + o(d!) is the (d + 1)
th ordered Bell number [5]. With (d + 1)! ≥(
d+1
e
)d+1
, the competitive ratio is in Ω
((
d+1
e ln(2)
)d+1)
.
Please note that this lower bound also holds for PersonalCostWalk. For this algo-
rithm, the construction by Harks et al. [19] gives a lower bound of (d+ 1)d+1.
1The n-th ordered Bell number counts the number of partitions of an n-element set into k nonempty subsets.
An =
1
2
∑∞
m=0
m
n
2m
= n!
2 lnn+1(2)
+ o((n− 1)!) [5].
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5 Appendix
5.1 Missing Details in Section 3.1
Lemma 9. The equation (d + 1)(x + 1)d = xd+1 has a unique solution Ψd in R≥0 for all
d ∈ R≥0. Moreover, Ψd ∈ [d/W ( dd+1 )− 1, d/W ( dd+1 )], where W : R≥0 → R≥0 is the product
logarithm function on R≥0.
Proof. We first show that the equation (d+ 1)(x+ 1)d = xd+1 has a unique solution. Since
this solution is not x = 0 we may assume x 6= 0, take logarithms and obtain the equivalent
equation
log(d+ 1) + d log(x+ 1) = (d+ 1) log x .
Rearranging terms yields
log(x+ 1)− log(x) = log x− log(d+ 1)
d
. (5)
The left hand side of this equation is decreasing in x and takes values in (0,∞). The right
hand side is increasing in x and for x ∈ [d + 1,∞), it takes values in (0,∞). Thus, the
equation has a unique solution which we denote by Ψd.
To get an approximate closed form expression for Ψd, we use (5) and the mean value
theorem to obtain
1
ξ
=
logΨd − log(d+ 1)
d
for some ξ ∈ (Ψd,Ψd + 1).
We obtain
Ψd ∈
{
x ∈ [d+ 1,∞) : 1
x+ 1
≤ log x− log(d+ 1)
d
≤ 1
x
}
.
As log x is strictly increasing in x and both 1x+1 and
1
x are decreasing, we obtain Ψd ∈ [a, b]
where a is the unique solution to the equation dx+1 = log x− log(d+ 1) and b is the unique
solution to the equation dx = log x− log(d+ 1). The latter equation gives
d
b
= log
b
d+ 1
⇔ ed/bd
b
=
d
d+ 1
.
Using that W is bijective on R≥0 and that W (xex) = x for all x ∈ R≥0, this implies
d
b = W (
d
d+1) and, hence, b = d/W (
d
d+1 ). To get a bound on a, note that a ≥ a′ where a′
solves da′+1 = log(a
′+1)− log(d+1). Substituting b = a′+1, we obtain a′ = d/W ( dd+1 )− 1
as before.
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5.2 Missing Details in Section 3.3
Proof of Theorem 5. The structure of the instance is the same as for Theorem 8. There
are n requests N with weights wi = c
(⌊log(n)⌋−⌊log(i)⌋), where c is a non-negative constant
that will be chosen later. In addition, there are n+ 1 resources rj , each resource with cost
crj (x) = x
d. Request i ∈ [n] can be either allocates to ri−2⌊log(i)⌋+1 or ri+1.
In the optimal solution, every request i gets assigned to resources ri+1, so no resource
has more than one player. Therefore, the cost of the optimal solution is
C(S∗) =
⌊log(n)⌋∑
i=0
2i
(
c⌊log(n)⌋−i
)d+1
.
The order of arrival of the request is in decreasing order from n to 1. We assume that the
tie-breaking is towards the resource with the lower index. In this way, whenever a request
arrives, the load on both resources is identical. Therefore, in both algorithms Personal-
CostWalk and SocialCostWalk, all requests i get assigned to resources ri−2⌊log(i)⌋+1.
In the end, the load on resource rj is
∑⌊log(n)⌋−⌈log(j)⌉
i=0 c
i. So the total cost of the algorithm
is
C(S) =
n+1∑
j=1

⌊log(n)⌋−⌈log(j)⌉∑
i=0
ci


d+1
=
⌊log(n)⌋−1∑
j=0

2⌊log(n)⌋−j−1
(
j∑
i=0
ci
)d+1+

⌊log(n)⌋∑
i=0
ci


d+1
.
This gives the ratio
C(S)
C(S∗)
≥
∑⌊log(n)⌋−1
j=0 2
⌊log(n)⌋−j−1
(∑j
i=0 c
i
)d+1
∑⌊log(n)⌋
i=0 2
i(c⌊log(n)⌋−i)d+1
=
∑⌊log(n)⌋−1
i=0 2
⌊log(n)⌋−i−1
(
ci+1−1
c−1
)d+1
∑⌊log(n)⌋
i=0 2
⌊log(n)⌋−ici(d+1)
=
∑⌊log(n)⌋−1
i=0 2
−i−1 (ci+1 − 1)d+1∑⌊log(n)⌋
i=0 2
−ici(d+1) (c− 1)d+1
.
Here we used the geometric sum and reordered the terms. We choose c = 21/(d+1) and get
C(S)
C(S∗)
≥
∑⌊log(n)⌋−1
i=0 2
−i−1
(
2
i+1
d+1 − 1
)d+1
∑⌊log(n)⌋
i=0
(
2
1
(d+1) − 1)
)d+1 =
∑⌊log(n)⌋−1
i=0
(
1− 2− i+1d+1
)d+1
(1 + ⌊log(n)⌋)
(
2
1
d+1 − 1
)d+1 .
At this point, we rewrite
(
1− 2− i+1d+1
)d+1
=
(
2
i+1
d+1−1
2
i+1
d+1
)d+1
=
(
2
i+1
d+1−1
)d+1
2i+1 . Applying
Lemma 10 gives us
(
2
i+1
d+1 − 1
)d+1
≥ 2i for all i ≥ log2(e)(d+ 1)2, this yields
C(S)
C(S∗)
≥
∑⌊log(n)⌋−1
i=log2(e)(d+1)
2
1
2∑⌊log(n)⌋
i=0
(
2
1
(d+1) − 1)
)d+1 =
(⌊log(n)⌋ − log2(e)(d + 1)2 − 1)
2(1 + ⌊log(n)⌋)
(
2
1
(d+1) − 1)
)d+1 .
In the limit for n→∞ this is 1
2( d+1
√
2−1)d+1
.
Lemma 10. The inequality (ex − 1)x ≥ ex2−1 holds for all x ≥ 2.
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Proof. The inequality trivially holds for x = 2 with (e2 − 1)2 = e4 − 2e2 + 1 ≥ e3. Next we
consider the derivatives of both sides of the inequality
∂
∂x
(ex − 1)x = (ex − 1)x
(
exx
ex − 1 + log (e
x − 1)
)
,
and
∂
∂x
ex
2−1 = 2ex
2−1x .
Obviously both derivatives are positive for x > 2. Furthermore, the ratio of the derivatives
is greater than 1 for all x > 2 and therefore the left side grows faster than the right one
(ex − 1)x
(
exx
ex−1 + log (e
x − 1)
)
2ex2−1x
=
(ex − 1)x−1
2ex−1
+
log (ex − 1)
2ex2−1x
≥ (e
x − 1)x−1
2ex−1
=
(
ex−1 − 1e
)x−1
x−1
√
2
≥ 1 ,
for x > 2.
5.3 Missing Details in Section 4.1
Proof of Theorem 7. We will prove that there is a constant d0 such that we can upper
bound the competitive ratio for all online resource allocation problems with polynomial cost
functions with maximal degree d by (Ξd)d+1 for all d ≥ d0.
Fix d ≥ d0 and assume that resource r has cost equal to xdr with dr < d. The algorithm
minimizes the current user’s cost in each step, that is, we have∑
r∈Si
(wr(S<i + 1))
dr ≤
∑
r∈S∗
i
(wr(S<i + 1))
dr .
The total cost can be written as the sum of the marginal increases to the total cost functions,
i.e. we can also write
C(S) =
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈Si
(
(wr(S<i + 1))
dr+1 − wr(S<i)dr+1
)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈Si
(
dr∑
k=0
wr(S<i)
k
(
dr + 1
k
)
+ (wr(S<i) + 1)
dr · (dr + 1)
)
−
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈Si
(
(wr(S<i) + 1)
dr · (dr + 1)
)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈Si
(
(dr + 1) (wr(S<i) + 1)
dr +
dr∑
k=0
wr(S<i)
k (dr + 1)!
k!(dr + 1− k)!
)
−
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈Si
dr∑
k=0
(
wr(S<i)
k dr!
k!(dr − k)! · (dr + 1)
)
,
where we used that
∑dr+1
k=0 a
k
(
dr
k
)
= (a+ 1)dr+1. We get
C(S) ≤
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈S∗
i
(dr + 1) (wr(S<i) + 1)
dr +
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈Si
dr−1∑
k=0
−wr(S<i)k
(
dr + 1
k
)
(dr − k) ,
by using the definition of the algorithm. In the following, we use wr(S<i) ≤ wr(S) and that
wr(S<i)
k can be written as j − 1 in the second sum, if i is the j-th request that has been
allocated to r in S. We get
C(S) ≤
∑
r∈R
(dr + 1)wr(S
∗)(wr(S) + 1)dr −
∑
r∈R
wr(S)∑
j=1
dr−1∑
k=0
(j − 1)k
(
dr + 1
k
)
(dr − k)
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Now we bound the tripple sum as follows
∑
r∈R
wr(S)∑
j=1
dr−1∑
k=0
(j − 1)k
(
dr + 1
k
)
(dr − k) ≥
∑
r∈R
dr−1∑
k=0
(
dr + 1
k
)
(dr − k)
∫ wr(S)
1
(j − 1)kdj
≥
∑
r∈R
dr−1∑
k=0
(
dr + 1
k
)
(dr − k)
(
1
k + 1
(wr(S)− 1)k+1 − 1
k + 1
)
≥
∑
r∈R
dr−1∑
k=0
(
dr + 1
k + 1
)
dr − k
dr − k + 1
(
(nr(S)− 1)k+1 − 1
)
≥
∑
r∈R
dr∑
k=1
(
dr + 1
k
)
dr − k + 1
dr − k + 2
(
(wr(S)− 1)k − 1
)
=
∑
r∈R
wr(S)
dr+2 − (wr(S)− 1)dr+2
dr + 2
.
In Lemma 11, we will show, that we can find suitable λd and µd such that
(dr + 1)(y + 1)
drx− ydr−1 + y
dr+2 − (y − 1)dr+2
dr + 2
≤ λdxdr+1 + µdydr+1
for all x, y ∈ N≥0 and dr ≤ d. Applying this to all r ∈ R yields a competitive ratio of λd1−µd .
So we seek to minimize λd1−µd such that the inequality is fulfilled. We will show in Lemma
11 that there is a solution to the minimization problem such that λd1−µd is upper bounded
by (Ξd)d+1.
Lemma 11. For sufficiently large d, we have
min
λd≥0,µd∈(0,1)
λd
1− µd ≤ a · (Ξd)
d+1,
and (dr + 1)(y + 1)
drx − ydr+1 + ydr+2−(y−1)dr+2dr+2 ≤ λdxdr+1 + µdydr+1 ∀x, y ∈ N≥1 and
dr ≤ d, where Ξ is the solution to 0 = 2xe 1x + x2 − e 2x − x2e 1x , i.e. Ξ ≈ 1.523.
Proof. Let dr ≤ d and d sufficiently large. In this proof, we will distinguish 3 cases. First,
we show the Lemma for x, y ∈ N≥1 with y ≤ dr. Second, we will consider the case y >
dr, x ≥ 2 and we will finish the proof with the case y > dr, x = 1. For all 3 cases, we will
choose µd = 1− ǫ with a sufficiently small, but constant ǫ (i.e. µd is independent of d) and
λd = (Ξd)
d+1. We will show that
max
x,y

 (dr + 1)(y + 1)
drx− ydr+1 + ydr+2−(y−1)dr+2dr+2 − (1− ǫ)ydr+1
xdr+1

 ≤ (Ξd)d+1 .
for sufficiently small ǫ.
Case 1: y ≤ dr. First, we use that y
dr+2−(y−1)dr+2
dr+2
≤ ydr+1. We get
max
x,y

 (dr + 1)(y + 1)
drx− ydr+1 + ydr+2−(y−1)dr+2dr+2 − (1− ǫ)ydr+1
xdr+1


≤ max
x,y
{
(dr + 1)(y + 1)
drx− (1 − ǫ)ydr+1
xdr+1
}
≤ max
x,y
{
(dr + 1)(y + 1)
drx
xdr+1
}
≤ max
y
{
(dr + 1)(y + 1)
dr
}
≤ (dr + 1)dr+1 ≤ (d+ 1)d+1 ≤ (Ξd)d+1,
where the last inequality holds for all d ≥ 8.
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Case 2: y > dr, x = 1 For the case y > dr, x = 1, we have
max
y
{
(dr + 1)(y + 1)
dr − (2− ǫ)ydr+1 + y
dr+2 − (y − 1)dr+2
dr + 2
}
≤ max
y
{
ydr
(
(dr + 1)(1 +
1
y
)dr − (2− ǫ)y + y2
1− (1 − 1y )dr+2
dr + 2
)}
.
We use that (1 + 1x)
x ≤ e ≤ (1 + 1x)x−1 and get
max
y
{
ydr
(
(dr + 1)(e)
dr
y − (2− ǫ)y + y2 1− e
−dr+2
y−1
dr + 2
)}
.
As in the other cases, we replace y with cdr, this gives us
max
c
{
(cdr)
dr
(
(dr + 1)(e)
1
c − (2− ǫ)cdr + (cdr)2 1− e
− dr+2
cdr−1
dr + 2
)}
≤ max
c
{
(cdr)
dr
(
(dr + 1)(e)
1
c − (2− ǫ)cdr + c2dr
(
1− e− 1c
))}
.
Here we use 1−e
− 1
c
dr
≥ 1−e−
dr+2
cdr−1
dr+2
⇔ 2 ≥ (dr + 2)e− 1c − e−
dr+2
cdr−1 , which holds true for all c
and dr such that cdr > 1.
We observe that the first part of the product is increasing in c and the second part
decreasing c. In the following, we derive an upper bound c¯(dr) on the maximum c that
depends on dr. Note that the expression is negative, if the inner bracket is negative.
(dr + 1)(e)
1
c − (2− ǫ)cdr + c2dr
(
1− e− 1c
)
< 0
⇔dr < − e
1
c
e
1
c − 2c+ c2 − c2e− 1c =
e
2
c
2ce
1
c + c2 − e 2c − c2e 1c .
Thus for these pairs (c, dr), the lemma is fulfilled trivially. Let
¯
d(c) =
e
2
c
2ce
1
c + c2 − e 2c − c2e 1c ,
and note that the right hand side is decreasing in c. Thus, there is a bijection between c
and
¯
d(c), so we can also consider the inverse function c¯(dr) that is monotonically decreasing
in dr. So, we get an upper bound on c dependent on dr and have
max
c
{
(cdr)
dr
(
(dr + 1)(e)
1
c − (2− ǫ)cdr + c2dr
(
1− e− 1c
))}
≤ max
c
{
(c¯(dr)dr)
dr
(
(dr + 1)(e)
1
c − (2 − ǫ)cdr + c2dr
(
1− e− 1c
))}
In the following, we argue that c¯(dr)dr is monotonically increasing in dr and thus, can be
upper bounded by c¯(d)d. In order to do so, note that c
¯
d(c) is monotonically decreasing in c.
Now, c¯(dr) ·
¯
d(c¯(dr)) = c¯(dr) · dr is monotonically increasing in dr, since c¯(dr) is decreasing
in dr. We use that the second part of the product is decreasing in c to get
(c¯(d)d)dmax
c
{(
(dr + 1)(e)
1
c − (2 − ǫ)cdr + c2dr
(
1− e− 1c
))}
≤ (c¯(d)d)d ((dr + 1)(e)1 − (2− ǫ)dr + (1− e−1))
≤ (c¯(d)d)d ((e − 2 + ǫ)d+ (e + 1− e−1))
It remains to bound c¯(d). We have already argued that c¯(d) is decreasing in d and tends
to Ξ that solves
0 = 2xe
1
x + x2 − e 2x − x2e 1x ,
that is, we get an upper bound of
(Ξd)d
(
(e − 2 + ǫ)d+ (e+ 1− e−1)) ≤ (Ξd)d+1 ,
for sufficiently large d.
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Case 3: y > dr, x ≥ 2 We start again by using y
dr+2−(y−1)dr+2
dr+2
≤ ydr+1 and derive
max
x,y

 (dr + 1)(y + 1)
drx− ydr+1 + ydr+2−(y−1)dr+2dr+2 − (1− ǫ)ydr+1
xdr+1


≤ max
x,y
{
(dr + 1)(y + 1)
drx− (1 − ǫ)ydr+1
xdr+1
}
.
Now, let x∗, y∗ be the maximizer of the term above. For fixed dr and y∗, we write y∗ = c ·dr
with some c > 1. We can rewrite the term as
max
x,c
{
(dr + 1)(cdr + 1)
drx− (1− ǫ)(cdr)dr+1
xdr+1
}
≤ max
x,c
{( c
x
dr
)dr (
(dr + 1)
(
1 +
1
cdr
)dr
− (1− ǫ)cdr 1
x
)}
≤ max
x,c
{( c
x
dr
)dr (
(dr + 1)e
1
c − (1− ǫ)cdr 1
x
)}
.
In the following, we again derive an upper bound c¯(dr) · x∗ on the maximal possible factor
c dependent on dr and x
∗. This upper bound fulfills
0 ≤ (dr + 1)e
1
c¯(dr)·x∗ − (1− ǫ)c¯(dr) · dr ≤ (dr + 1)e
1
2c¯(dr) − (1− ǫ)c¯(dr) · dr
We can show analogously to Case 2 that the right hand side is decreasing in c¯(dr) and
x∗ c¯(dr)dr
x∗ is increasing in dr. We derive
max
x
{(
c¯(dr)x
x
dr
)dr (
(dr + 1)e
1 − (1− ǫ)dr 1
x
)}
≤ max
x
{
(c¯(d)d)
d
(
(dr + 1)e
1 − (1− ǫ)dr 1
x
)}
≤ (c¯(d)d)d ((d+ 1)e) .
In the following, we can upper bound c¯(d) that solves 0 = (d + 1)e
1
2c¯(d) − (1 − ǫ)c¯(d) · d by
1.389 for sufficiently large d. This yields
(c¯(d)d)
d
((d+ 1)e) ≤ (Ξd)d+1 ,
for d large enough, which completes the proof.
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